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Wald: Presidio Trust and National Parks

ARTICLE
THE PRESIDIO TRUST AND OUR
NATIONAL PARKS: NOT A MODEL
TO BE TRUSTED
BY JOHANNA H. WALD*

1. INTRODUCTION

The Presidio is unique. As a large area of natural habitat in
a congested urban landscape, as a site which retains centuries
of historic and prehistoric artifacts, as the longest continually
operating military base in the United States, and as the southern promontory of the Golden Gate Bridge, one of the world's
most recognized vistas, the Presidio is without equal.
Also unique are the politics which led to the terms under
which this national park is now being managed. The l04th
Congress, and particularly its leadership, mounted an unprecedented assault on America's public lands, including our
national parks. Those leaders called for no less than eliminat-

* Johanna Wald is a Senior Attorney and Director of the Land Program in the
San Francisco office of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The holder of
a law degree from Yale University, Ms. Wald has been with NRDC for 25 years, during
which time she has become an expert on federal land and resource management issues,
brought major litigation involving the federal coal leasing and range management
programs, and authored a variety of publications. She and others at NRDC were involved in the effort to enact Presidio Trust legislation as well as in the other legislative
battles described in this article. Ms. Wald thanks Brian Huse, Pacific Regional Director of the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), for his invaluable
assistance in the writing of this article as well as in the legislative battles it describes.
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ing parks and ending federal ownership and control of vast areas of the public estate. While unsuccessful in this frontal attack, they did succeed in inserting elements of their agenda
into otherwise positive or innocuous legislation. The Presidio
Trust bill, the topic of this article, came nowhere near accomplishing what those leaders hoped to accomplish. Yet a close
analysis reveals troubling provisions heretofore unthinkable
for management of our national parks. In sum, while the Presidio Trust legislation could have been worse, it needs to be
improved for the sake of the Presidio and cannot be viewed as a
model for the management of other parks.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM AND
WHY THE PRESIDIO IS UNIQUE
The idea of national parks is a uniquely American concept,
ranking with our democratic form of government and the Bill of
Rights as one of the best ideas our country has ever had. Since
the establishment of Yellowstone National Park in 1872, the
National Park System has evolved and been systematically expanded to accommodate our desire to preserve the natural, cultural, and historic treasures which define our landscape and
identify us as a nation. 1 Today, there are a total of 375 parks of
various different types and different designations or titles
within the park system.2 The Presidio stands out among them
all: not only does it have outstanding natural, cultural, and
historic values, it also could justifiably bear numerous different
designations.
After setting aside Yellowstone, the United States began
preserving large tracts of western federal lands as either national parks or national monuments. In general, national
parks, such as Yosemite and Sequoia in California, and Glacier
in Montana, set aside an array of resources within boundaries

1. For an overview of the history of the National Park System, see, e.g., DYAN
ZAsLOWSKY, THESE AMERICAN LANDS: PARKS, WILDERNESS, AND THE PUBUC LANDS
(Island Press 1994).
2. See SHARON BUCCINO, ET AL, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, RECLAIMING OUR HERITAGE: WHAT WE
NEED TO DO TO PRESERVE AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS 2 (1997).
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that are hopefully large enough to provide them adequate protection. 3 Monuments, on the other hand, usually protect a single, nationally significant resource, whether natural or cultural. Broadly speaking, monuments are smaller than national
parks and focus the visitor's attention on the particular feature
being preserved. The towering columns of basaltic rock at
Devil's Postpile in California's Sierra Nevada mountains and
the rich fossils beds at Dinosaur on the border between Colorado and Utah are among the nation's seventy-four national
monuments. The newest of our monuments - Grand StaircaseEscalante in Utah - was established in September 1996, by
President Clinton.4 Other types of units which preserve natural resources and are under the jurisdiction of the National
Park Service include national preserves, national lakeshores
and seashores, national wild and scenic rivers, and national
scenic trails. 5
Early on, national parks and the western monuments were
administered by the Department of the Interior.6 Other national monuments, historic sites, and protected lands, however,
were administered by the War Department and the U.S. Forest
Service. A 1933 Executive Order transferred sixty-three of
these other sites to the jurisdiction. of the National Park Service as a means of providing more efficient and consistent protection. 7 This consolidation created a true system of parks protecting both natural and historic resources under a single
agency with a single management mandate.

3. In fact, however, many existing parks are not large enough. Our oldest and
largest national park, Yellowstone, is not large enough to support viable populations of
many of its wildlife species. See T. W. Clark & D. Zaunbrecher, The Greater Yellow·

stone Ecosystem: The Ecosystem Concept in Natural Resource Policy and Management,
5 RENEWABLE RESOURCES JOURNAL 8·16 (1987).
4. See THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL MONUMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (September 18, 1996).
5. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 2.
6. The National Park Service was created in the Department of the Interior in
1916, and given responsibility for protecting America's national parks and monuments.
See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq (1994).
7. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK INDEX, GPO: 1995 .
387·035f20001, at 7.
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Of course, the decision to preserve a wider array of resources as national parks led to the creation not only of more
kinds of parks, but also of more designations for them. Today
more than half of the units in the park system protect locations
and celebrate persons and events important to the Nation's
history. From the interpretation of the 2,000 year old artifacts
and archeological sites of Ohio's Hopewell Culture National
Historical Park, to the protection of our nation's birthplace,
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, to the memorialization of
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II at
Manzanar National Historic Site in California, units of the National Park System protect important elements of America's
history and pre-history. In addition to national historical
parks and national historic sites, our Revolutionary and Civil
War history is preserved under such designations as national
military parks and national battlefield parks.
Still other areas and their resources are protected under the
relatively new designation of National Recreation Area. Originally this designation was applied to parks adjacent to or surrounding man-made reservoirs. Now these areas include other
lands set aside by Congress for recreational purposes, the most
significant of which are urban recreation areas such as the
Golden Gate and Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation
Areas. These important parks not only protect nationally significant resources, they also provide a national park experience
for many people who are unable to travel farther than the edge
of the city and would otherwise never have such an experience.
In general, each of the 375 units of the National Park System concentrates on a particular ecosystem, natural or historic
landmark, or a particular period in time as indicated by its
particular name or designation. Unlike most park units, however, the Presidio does not have a specific designation: it is actually "only" a part of the Golden Gate National Recreation
Area ("GGNRA").8 What is more, unlike virtually all other
parks, it could rightly exist on its own as anyone of several
8. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-333, 110 Stat. 4093, 16 U.S.C. § 460bb note (1996), Title I - The Presidio of San
Francisco, § 101(4) and (5).
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designations - as a national park, a national monument, a national historic park, or a national military park.
From a military perspective, the Presidio is truly unique. In
no other park can one fmd the depth and breadth of military
history that is present in the Presidio. In continuous operation
from 1776 until it was transferred to the National Park Service
on October 1, 1994,9 the Presidio retains archeological sites,
artifacts, and structures from its occupation by the nations of
Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Moreover, the Presidio
has played a role in every major war fought by the United
States and has even helped to protect parks as well. During
the early 1900's, Buffalo Soldiers, billeted in the Presidio,
regularly rode out to patrol Yosemite, Sequoia and General
Grant National Parks. 10 The architecture of the Presidio reflects every major construction period of U.S. military history
since 1848. 11
Yet, the Presidio's historical significance is not limited to
the martial. Within its borders are archeological sites that
predate European settlement of the area and offer a glimpse
into the lives of the native OhIone people. 12 Some 550 buildings within its borders are on the National Register of Historic
Places and "contribute to the national landmark designation
for the entire Presidio."13 It was at Crissy Field on the northern shore of the Presidio that military aviation on the west
coast was established. 14 The Presidio served as a refugee center following the devastating 1906 San Francisco earthquake,
and then hosted part of the 1915 Panama-Pacific International
Exposition that celebrated the city's rebirth.15

9. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995).
10. See NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN
AMENDMENT, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, GoLDEN GATE NATIONAL RECREATION

AREA, CALIFORNlA 8 (1994) [hereinafter, "NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN
AMENDMENT"J. General Grant National Park, established in 1890, was expanded and
renamed Kings Canyon National Park in 1940.
11. See id. at 7.
12. See id. at 8.
13. H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995).
14. See NPS FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 8.

15. See id.
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The Presidio also easily fits the designation of national
monument. As a national historic landmark16 sitting on one of
the world's most photographed promontories at the foot of the
Golden Gate Bridge, the site is one of a kind. Finally, as a national park, the Presidio would still be without peer. Perhaps
small for a national park, the site contains a variety of resources not found in areas 100 times its sizeP
On the edge of an urban area with a population of five million people, the Presidio stands in stark contrast to the congested landscape around it. Some 220 years of military occupation have resulted in the retention of astounding natural features and rich biodiversity. Lobos Creek, which runs along and
within the Presidio's southern border, is San Francisco's only
remaining free-flowing above-ground stream and supports native riparian habitat. IS In all, ten native plant communities
can be found on the Presidio, including wetlands, grasslands,
and sand dunes. 19 The Army's historic forest provides not only
a stunning cultural landscape, but also habitat for neotropical
migrant songbirds and state and federally listed endangered
plant species. 2o The Presidio also harbors miles of hiking
trails, tennis courts, and a golf course21 and receives a high
volume of visitors on its own as well as as part of the GGNRA,
which is the second most visited of our parks nationwide.22
The Presidio is indeed unique. In addition to its outstanding natural, cultural and historic resources, the Presidio has
3.5 million square feet of useable building space. In fact, the
former base is a small city, complete with water, sewer, electricity, and telephone systems. Unlike other national parks,
where use of resources is forbidden or closely controlled, the

16. See id. at 7.
17. NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AsSOCIATION, FACT SHEET: PROTECTING
THE SAN FRANCISCO PRESIDIO (1995) !hereinafter "NPCA, PRESIDIO FACT SHEET"J.

18. See id. at 9.
19. See id.

20. See PETE HOLLORAN, SEEING THE TREES THROUGH THE FOREST: OAKS AND
HISTORY ON THE PRESIDIO (City Lights 1997).
21. See id.
22. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at App. 1, 84-92.
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Presidio's historic buildings must be used. Empty buildings
fall apart.
Occupied buildings can be better maintained and protected,
thus extending their lives.23 The simplest and most cost effective way to preserve the Presidio's buildings - which numbered
approximately 870 at the time the Trust legislation was enacted24 - is by renting them and reinvesting the rents in maintenance.
The Park Service, however, is not a real estate agency and
lacks the expertise needed to manage and rent these buildings
or to finance and supervise the rehabilitation that many of
them need. 25 This fact, together with the sheer magnitude of
the property management task at the Presidio, provided the
original impetus for the notion of creating a new entity to work
with the Park Service to carry out this task. 26 That notion and
early legislative proposals to accomplish it;27 were drastically
different than the final Trust legislation, thanks to the leaders
ofthe 104th Congress and their anti-environmental agenda.
III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA OF THE 104TH
CONGRESS: LIQUIDATING THE FEDERAL ESTATE
The legislation creating the Presidio Trust was enacted on
the last day of the 104th Congress as part of an omnibus parks
bill that, among other things, also created the Tallgrass Prairie
National Park and provided protection for Sterling Forest on

23. See, e.g., NPCA, PRESIDIO FACT SHEET, supra note 17.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 6 (1995).
25. The Park Service has estimated that it would take $590 million in capitol improvements to restore the Presidio's historic buildings and remove the non-historic
ones. See NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at 141. It
has also conceded that it lacks the necessary expertise. See id. at 112.
26. See, e.g., NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at
21-22, 114. See also S. 1639, 103rd Cong., (1993); H.R. 3433, 103d Cong., (1993).
27. See, e.g., H.R. 3433, 103rd Congo (1993) and S. 1639, 103d Cong., (1993), both
of which would have created a corporation, the Presidio Corporation, within the Department of the Interior to manage the leasing, maintenance, rehabilitation, repair and
improvement of specified properties located at the Presidio.
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the New YorklNew Jersey border.28 That the legislation also
included controversial provisions and specifically provisions of
the Trust bill is hardly surprising. The l04th Congress saw a
frontal assault on America's federal lands, led by westerners in
the House, under the pretext of deficit reduction and government efficiency. The overall aim of this assault was nothing
less than the dismantling of the public estate, by transferring
as many as possible of our public lands to the states and private interests. 29 Far more ambitious than the "privatization"
scheme of the Reagan era, which sought to sell off "only" about
five percent of the public's lands in total,30 bills in the l04th
Congress sought to put hundreds of millions of acres on the
block. These bills formed the backdrop against which the Presidio Trust legislation was debated and ultimately enacted and
against which the legislation must be judged.
The l04th Congress saw an unprecedented attack on
America's public lands. To achieve the goal of dismantling the
federal estate, members introduced a variety of legislative proposals including bills to (1) sell the public lands outright to private interests; (2) give them away - typically to the states in
which they were located; and (3) prevent federal managers
from carrying out their management responsibilities through
either the budget process or the more traditional legislative
process. 3t Parks were not immune from these attacks; in fact,
as discussed below, anti-public land forces in the Congress
tried to pass legislation to liquidate the National Park System.

A. SELLING PUBLIC LANDS
Prior to the l04th Congress and following passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, Congressional budget rules expressly prohibited the sale of federal assets to be "scored" - ie.,

28. See Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Title 10, Subtitles A and B.
29. See JOHANNA H. WALD & S. YASSA, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,
SELLING OUR HERITAGE - CONGRESSIONAL PLANs FOR AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS (1995).
30. See, e.g., Johanna H. Wald & Elizabeth H. Temkin, The Sagebrush Rebellion:
The West Against Itself - Again, 2 J. ENVTL L. 187 (1982) (citing Budget Contains Pro·
gram to Sell 5 percent of Public Lands, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, Feb. 18, 1982, at 2.
31. See generally, WALD & YASSA, supra note 29.
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counted - in the budget process for purposes of deficit reduction, in recognition of the fact that liquidation of national assets was not a sound or appropriate way to reduce the deficit.32
The 104th Congress, however, departed radically from this
prior practice early in its first session.
The House and Senate Budget Resolutions, passed in May
1995, authorized the sale of federal "assets" - national parks,
national wildlife refuges, national forests and rangelands and
any other federal properties - in order to generate income to
balance the budget.33 This "asset sale rule" would have allowed
Congress to sell the nation's lands to private commercial interests under the pretext of budget cutting.
Parks were not exempted from this new approach to balancing the budget. Indeed, the Fiscal Year 1996 budget envisioned by the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee called
for selling the Presidio outright over a period of three years?4
Proponents of selling the Presidio and other federal lands
argued that the nation could not afford to maintain all of our
parks and especially not those that were allegedly of only local
or regional significance, rather than national importance.
With its budget of $25 million, the Presidio was - and is - the
most expensive of all parks in the system.35 Accordingly, it was
a natural focus of their attack.
B. GMNG THE PUBLIC LANDS AWAY: TRANSFER, CLOSURE, AND
COMMERCIALIZATION

In addition to promoting the sale of federal lands, the antifederal land forces in the 104th Congress also promoted an outright - and massive - giveaway of these lands to the states.
The giveaway plan was originally hatched by the Heritage

32. See WALD & YASSA, supra note 29, at 4.
33. See S. CON. RES. 13, 104th Congo (1995); H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Congo
(1995).

34. See STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 104th Cong., FY 1996
BALANCED BUDGET RESOLUTION CHAIRMAN'S MARK (1995).
35. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 7, 13 (1995). ("The greatest concern of the
[House Resources) Committee has been the cost of the Presidio.").
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Foundation, a conservative think tank, which recommended
that the Congress "begin a five to seven year effort to give most
of the land controlled by" the federal government to individual
states. 36 To facilitate this shift, the Foundation recommended
that the National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of
Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service be drastically downsized and merged into a single Bureau of Natural
Resources, and that the federal government then transfer
"most of the land controlled by this [new] agency back [sic]37 to
the states. n3B
Under the Heritage Foundation proposal, only a few select
parks and wilderness areas would be kept by the federal government - that is, the "parks and wilderness areas deemed of
national significancen39 - although they never specified what
that term meant or who would decide which parks and wildernesses qualified for retention. All other lands would be given
to the states along with "full authority to manage the resources
according to the values of the citizens of each state''"'o - including, presumably, the authority to privatize those resources - in
other words, to sell them to commercial interests.
Although several bills were introduced to give entire land
systems to the states in which they were located,41 no bill targeted the entire park system for outright transfer - perhaps
because even the most radical opponents of federal lands in
Congress understood how politically explosive such a proposal

3S. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY TO CUT INTERIOR AND RELATED
AGENCY SPENDING, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES 4 (1995)
!hereinafter "HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY"].
37. Contrary to the rhetoric of many in and out of Congress, we cannot give the
public lands "back" to the states, because the overwhelming majority of them, including
those in the West, never belonged to the states in the first place. Rather, the federal
government acting on behalf of all citizens, present and future, acquired the federal
public lands through treaty, conquest or purchase. See WALD & YASSA, supra note 29,
at 5, n. 14.
38. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A STRATEGY, supra note 36, at 4.
39. [d.
40. [d.
41. See, e.g., S. 1031, 104th Cong., (1995), and its companion in the House, H.R.
2032, 104th Cong., (1995), which would have given to the states all lands and minerals
under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management some 268 million acres located principally in the 11 western states and Alaska.
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would be. One bill was introduced, however, to give the administration of all of the national parks in South Dakota to
that state.
Based on a proposal by Governor Bill Janklow, Senate Bill
1185, the South Dakota National Parks Preservation Act,
would have allowed South Dakota to be given the responsibility
for maintaining, operating, and administering all national park
units within its borders.42 Janklow used the specter of closing
parks due to lack of funding to suggest that the state was in
the position of doing a better job.43 In return for having its
state bureaucracy manage the national parks, South Dakota
would receive those parks' regular federal appropriation.44
South Dakota, whose state parks are managed with the goal of
catalyzing development of its tourism economy, indicated it
would manage national park resources the same way.45 In addition, the state would be able to establish user fees to further
offset costS.46 On the whole, the bill sought to allow South Dakota to exploit national park resources for commercial gain,
while ensuring it would receive a subsidy for the effort.47
There was in fact no need for the enactment of such a bill:
the National Park Service was not planning to close down any
parks due to lack of funding. Even more importantly, the bill
was fundamentally incompatible with the principal reason why
we have a National Park Service - i.e., to ensure uniform and
consistent protection and preservation of our natural and cultural heritage. To apportion this responsibility among individ-

42. See S. 1185, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b) (1995).
43. See Statement of Lori M. Nelson, Heartland Regional Director, The National
Parks and Conservation Association, on Governor Janklow's South Dakota Proposal to
Manage South Dakota's National Parks. September 17. 1995. at 2-3 [hereinafter
"NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal"J.
44. See S. 1185. 104th Cong.• § 2(e) (1995).
45. See NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal. supra note 43. at 4.
46. See S. 1185. 104th Cong.• 1st Sess .• § 2(0 (1995).
47. In fact. as state and county governments are typically cash-poor. any transfers
of management responsibilities for. or of title to, federal park or other lands would need
to be accompanied by significant federal payments for operations and maintenance or
the result would be park liquidation and/or commercialization. Indeed, during the flrst
session of the 104th Congress. the California Department of Parks and Recreation was
engaged in its own attempt. known as the Phoenix Plan, to transfer some state parks
to city and county governments due to its lack of funds.
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ual states would not only require tremendous duplication of
effort, it would also undermine the preservation mandate necessary to protect these treasures.
In addition to attempting to transfer large amounts of park
lands out of the federal estate, park opponents in the 104th
Congress tried very hard to close down those that they deemed
"unnecessary" and "undeserving."
Representatives Jim Hansen (R-UT), Joel Hefley (R-CO),
and Don Young (R-AK) were among the members of the 104th
Congress who championed a bill to create a Park Closure
Commission patterned after the military base closure com mission. 48 Their bill, House Bill 260, contemplated a wholesale
reorganization of the National Park System.49 A "National
Park System Review Commission" would be established, with
the mission of identifying national parks for possible closure
and transfer to other authorities or for sale to the private sector. Members of the Commission would be appointed by the
majority party of the House and Senate.50 In addition, the bill
exempted the park closure review process from the National
Environmental Policy Act and specifically from the requirement that an environmental impact statement be prepared in
. connection with the selection of parks to be closed51 - thereby
denying members of the public the opportunity to participate in
the process.
The views of House Bill 260's supporters are illustrative of
congressional anti-public land, anti-park attitudes. Representative Young has attacked national parks and wilderness areas
for "locking up" valuable economic resources and has stated his
belief that our national parks would be better managed by private contractors. 52 Representative Hansen has stated: "The

48. See WALD& YASSA, supra note 29, at 8.
49. See id. See also letter from Congressman James V. Hansen to "Dear Utah
Citizens" (December 8, 1994).
50. See H.R. 260, 104th Cong., § 103(a), (b) (1995).
51. See id. at § 104.
52. See, e.g., letter from Congressman Don Young to "Dear Colleague" (March 14,
1995).
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question is not whether to close [national] parks, but how to
accomplish this goal. ... ..53 On another occasion, Mr. Hansen
opined that "[o]ne hundred and fifty parks of the some 368
need to be dropped ...54 Representative Hefley, talking about
House Bill 260, said: "None of the real parks - the legitimate
parks are - are going away. But do we need a New Orleans
Jazz Park? Some of those silly parks just don't make sense.'165
Representative John Doolittle (R-CA) has stated, "We should
vastly shrink the size of Redwood National Park, transfer some
to the county and sell the rest of it.'166
Moreover, a bill that clearly sought to commercialize the national parks, House Bill 3819/Senate Bill 1703, was introduced
late in the 104th Congress. This legislative proposal would
have allowed the sale of corporate "sponsorships" of the park
system. Supporters claimed that its passage would provide
much needed funds for the nation's parks. Opponents pointed
out that, at best, the bill would have raised less than three percent of estimated unmet park needs while tarnishing the fundamental idea of the National Park System.57 In addition, it
would have created an unavoidable conflict of interest on the
part of Interior Secretaries that would compromise their ability
to protect public lands in the future: the bill would have made
them dependent on corporate sponsors for funds even as they
were responsible for exercising broad regulatory authority over
the activities of the same corporations on public lands.58
Lastly, opponents feared that, in addition to providing little
actual additional financing, the legislation could well have led

53. THE AMICUS JOURNAL, Spring 1997, at 3 (an NRDC publication).
54. Don Bowman, ESA Rewrite Dominated Western States Summit, ELKO DAILY
FREE PRESS, July 31, 1995.
55. _ _ , _ _, DENVER POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at _ .
56. Frank Clifford & Mark Lacey, Alaska Legislator Pushes to Loosen U.S. Grip on
Lands, LA TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at p.Al.
57. See NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE FINAL AssAULT: EN·
VIRONMENTAL ATTACKS ON THE OMNIBUS PARKS BILL 13 (September 1996) [hereinafter
"NRDC, THE FINAL AssAULT"J. Supporters predicted the bill would raise $100 million.
At that time, estimated park needs were estimated to total $4 billion. Since then, that
estimate has been significantly increased. See, e.g., BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 12-14.
58. See NRDC, THE FINAL AssAULT, supra note 57, at 13.
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to future Congresses offsetting the funds raised through sponsorship sales by decreases in appropriations.59
Attempts were made to add Senate Bill 1703 to the Omnibus Parks Bill, and for a while, its inclusion - along with a
number of other environmentally destructive proposals threatened to bring the whole parks bill down.60
C. TYING AGENCY HANDS

The 104th Congress tried repeatedly and in different ways
to tie the hands of federal land managers, particularly employees of the National Park Service, the U.S. Forest Service and
the Bureau of Land Management, so that they could not manage the lands entrusted to them in an environmentally responsible manner. When it came to the Park Service, Congress' favorite way of accomplishing this goal was by wielding its
budget ax.
The 104th Congress' original budget proposal contemplated
drastic cuts in the Park Service's budget. The Interior Department estimated that the cuts proposed for Fiscal Year 1996
would have amounted to a thirty-six percent reduction in the
National Park Service's budget over five years61 and would
have necessitated closure of numerous historic sites and several urban parks as well as the curtailment of visitor services
and resource protection efforts in large Western wilderness
parks. 62
At the same time, and only a year after the creation of what
was then the nation's newest park, Mojave National Preserve,

59. See id., pointing out that this had been congressional practice in the past under analogous circumstances.
60. See id. at 2-5. Previously, anti-wilderness forces in the 104th Congress had
sought to secure the passage of a controversial Utah wilderness bill by attaching to it
the Presidio Trust bill and the Sterling Forest bill. See Editorial, Free the Presidio!
Delink From Utah, S.F. CHRONICLE, March 29, 1996, at p. A22; Editorial, The Orrin
Hatch Land Grab, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1996, at p. _ .
61. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NEWS RELEASE, STATEMENT OF INTERIOR
SECRETARY BRUCE BABBITT RE: THE HOUSE BUDGET RESOLUTION (May 24, 1995).
62. See id.
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opponents tried to use the budget process to close it.63 On June
27, 1995, the House Appropriations Committee approved the
Fiscal Year 1996 Interior Appropriations bill with language
that would have prevented the National Park Service from
managing the Preserve, by transferring management funds
and personnel from the Park Service to the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM"), with instructions to manage the area
under BLM standards, not Park standards.64
Although both of these attempts ultimately failed, it was not
before the 104th Congress literally shut down the nation's
parks along with other federal offices and programs in a highly
publicized battle with the President over budget issues. At the
height of that battle, the National Park System was closed for
the first time in its eighty-year history, from December 16,
1995, to January 5, 1996.65 In all, 367 parks were closed - all
but two of the 369 units that then comprised the System.66
Only 2,500 of the Park Service's 20,000 employees remained on
duty, more than 383,000 visitors were turned away from parks
each day of the twenty-one-day shutdown at a daily cost to the
U.S. Treasury of $104,000 in entrance fees, and local communities lost nearly $14.2 million.67

63. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE YEAR OF LIVING
DANGEROUSLY: CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 1995 at 17 (1995).
64. See, e.g., NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AsSOCIATION, FACT SHEET:
WAR ON THE NATIONAL PARKS IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 1 (1995). The BLM manages
the federal lands under its jurisdiction, some 270 million acres, pursuant to the principles of multiple use and sustained yield. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1702(c), 1712(c) (1986). AB a result, virtually all nonconsumptive and economic uses, including livestock grazing, mineral production, and
timber harvesting, are permitted on BLM-managed lands, along with recreational and
non-economic activities. The National Park Service, in contrast, is charged with protecting parks from significant degradation so that future as well as present generations
can enjoy them. See National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See also
BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 2. Typically, consumptive and commodity uses are not allowed in parks, while hiking, camping and other recreational activities are.
65. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Shutcrown Closes National Park System,
3 PEOPLE LAND & WATER 14 (February 1996). Under agreements with the States of
Arizona and New Mexico, the south rim of Grand Canyon National Park and Carlsbad
Caverns National Park stayed open during the shutdown and limited services were
provided. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
See also NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION AssOCIATION, THE
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS: EFFECTS OF THE 1995-1996 GoVERNMENT
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IV. THE PRESIDIO LEGISLATION: ITS WEAKNESSES
AND ITS STRENGTHS
The anti-park agenda of members of the l04th Congress
was conspicuous during the debates over the future of the Presidio and is reflected in the actual legislation establishing the
Presidio Trust.
In its final form, the Presidio Trust legislation includes features which exemplify both the l04th Congress' attacks on
parks and public lands and the resultant public outcry which
prevented passage of those aggressive, draconian bills. While
legislation which attempted to close parks or slash their funding represented a relatively easy target to organize against,
even in the l04th Congress, the complexity of the Presidio's
management needs, as well as that of the legislation crafted to
address them, posed a far more difficult problem for the Park's
advocates.
A. THE PRESIDIO REGIME IS FLAWED

The Presidio Trust legislation created a new management
entity designed and established to manage the rehabilitation,
restoration, and leasing of the park's historic properties. The
Trust, which is managed by a seven member board composed of
experts in the fields of finance, property management, conservation, and business,68 is responsible for the development and
implementation of a program to rent and manage the Presidio's
now-vacant buildings. 69 To carry out this responsibility, the
Trust has been granted broad authority to hire staff, negotiate
contracts, and enter into joint powers agreements.70 It is also
empowered to guarantee loans and issue obligations to the Secretary of the Treasury.71

SHUTDOWNS ON SELECTED PARK-DEPENDENT BUSINESSES AND COMMUNITIES (1996)
!hereinafter "NPCA, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS"J.
68. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 103(cXIXA)-(B) (1996).
69. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(a).
70. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 103(cX7), 104(b).
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(d).
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Structured as "a wholly owned government corporation,"'2
the Trust and its board are independent of the Interior Department and the Executive Branch,73 and subject to minimal
public scrutiny.74 Instead, Congress made the Trust subject to
its authority and oversight. Accountability is to be achieved
through annual reports and goal statements that are to be delivered to the House Committee on Resources and the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 75 Further, Congress directed the General Accounting Office to study and report on the Trust's progress in meeting the obligations outlined
in the law and established a schedule for publication of the required reports. 76 These reports are to be addressed to the Senate Committees on Energy and Natural Resources and on Appropriations as well as to the Resources and Appropriations
Committees of the House of Representatives.77
Although these provisions are problematic,78 they are not
the most problematic provisions of the legislation. That distinction goes to still other provisions of the law - those that
deal with funding the park and the so-called "reversion clause."

72. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(cX10).
73. Under the original version of the Presidio legislation, the Trust was under the
jurisdiction of the Interior Department. In explaining why the Trust "would be an
independent government corporation," the Report on the House bill from the Committee on Resources, stated that "[tlhe Committee is convinced that separation of the
Trust from the Interior Department will result in an overall cost-savings to the government and increase the fmancial viability of the Trust." H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 9
(1995).
74. The Trust is required to hold only two open public meetings per year. See 16
U.S.C. § 103(cX6) (1996). In addition, it is not required to provide infonnation directly
to members of the public or to receive comments directly from the public. See id.
Rather, it is authorized to deal with the public "through the Golden Gate National
Recreation Area Advisory Commission," id., and it decided to do so at its first public
meeting.
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(cX10XB) (1996).
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 106.

77. See id.
78. For eXl\Illple, supporters of the trust concept strongly urged that the Presidio
Trust be under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior to ensure accountability as well as to maximize public involvement in its decision-making. See, e.g.,
letter from Johanna H. Wald and Ann Notthoff, National Resources Defense Council, to
the Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Parks, Historic
Preservation and Recreation (Dec. 6, 1995) (on me in NRDC's San Francisco office).
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In enacting the Presidio Trust legislation, Congress found
that the Trust is the vehicle by which the Presidio "will be
managed through an innovative public/private partnership
that minimizes cost to the United States Treasury and makes
efficient use of private sector resources."79 With this seventh,
and last, finding of the Trust bill, Congress laid the foundation
for the most far-reaching and unprecedented features of this
far-from-ordinary national park legislation.
The anti-park forces in Congress were pulled up short in
their effort to cut spending on parks. However, if they could
not spend any less on parks, they certainly were not going to
spend any more - and especially not in California, which had
recently benefited from the California Desert Protection Act.
The cost of maintaining the Presidio was, first and last, the
largest hurdle the park and its supporters had to overcome. No
matter that the Sixth Army spent over $70 million per year
during its occupation of the Presidio.8o The National Park
Service's bare bones budget of $25 million was simply unacceptable. 81 To ensure that far less than that amount would be
spent on the Presidio, Congress imposed real restrictions on
future appropriations in the Trust legislation.
Specifically, the law requires that, following submittal of a
fifteen-year business plan to Congress, appropriations to the
Trust will be restricted to the amounts specified in the plan.82
In addition, the law also requires the business plan to "include[ ] a schedule of annual decreasing federally appropriated
funding ... .',sa Finally, the law specifies that, following the
fifteenth year of its existence, the Trust will receive no further
appropriations. 84 Not only must the Trust "minimize cost to

79. 16 U.S.C. § 101(7).

80. See FEDERAL BUDGET, FY 1993.
81. The House Resources Committee referred to the $25 million cost as "unrealistic" and expressed the view that "development of a reasonable [fiscal) program [for the
Park) is essential." H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 11 (1995).
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(a)(2)(1994). The business plan must be submitted to Congress one year after the Trust's first meeting. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1994).
83. Id.
84. See id.
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the United States Treasury," but also, after fifteen years, it
cannot be a burden at all.
By these restrictions, the 104th Congress, thwarted in its
attempt to unencumber the Treasury from the responsibility of
supporting our national parks, adroitly shifted responsibility
for the Presidio to a new governmental entity. Although they
were unable to give it to an established governmental entity
such as the City of San Francisco, they created a new one and
gave it a wholly new mandate - that it "achieve, at a minimum,
self-sufficiency... within 15...years."a5
The 104th Congress also specified what was to happen in
the event that the Trust failed to attain self-sufficiency within
the required time period, notwithstanding the gradual reduction in appropriations, the cutting off of all funds after fifteen
years, and the diligent scrutiny of Congress. The obvious outcome in this event - at least in past Congresses --:- would have
been to return its governance to the National Park Service.
The 104th Congress, however, refused to entertain this option
for the Presidio: not only was it unwilling to appropriate funds
for the management of "ordinary" park units, it did. not believe
that the Park Service was capable of dealing with the unique
management problems posed by this far-from-ordinary park.86
Congress had, after all, removed the Trust and the lands it
would administer from the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Interior. If the Trust, which was specifically designed to address the situation at the Presidio, was not up to the task, then
Congress was certainly not going to give the Park Service the
chance to try.
Instead, Congress provided a simple and unequivocal directive in the event that the Trust failed to meet its mandate: Sell
the Presidio. The legislation's controversial "reversion" clause
provides that, if the Trust fails after fifteen years to meet its
obligations, all properties under its jurisdiction "shall be transferred" to the General Services Administration for disposal in
accordance with the provisions of the Defense Authorization

85. [d.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 104-234, at 10 (1995).
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Act of 1990, which in tum provide for sale or transfer out of
federal ownership.87 The legislation goes on to specify that
"any real property so transferred [shall] be deleted from the
Golden Gate National Recreation Area.',ss
B. THE PRESIDIO LEGISLATION COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE

The anti-park forces in the 104th Congress were nothing if
not persistent. Frustrated at not moving a single item on their
agenda, they clearly extracted a high price for passage of what
was to be the only park bill enacted during that session. Fortunately for the Presidio, they were not the only persistent
legislators working the bill. Representative Nancy Pelosi (DSan Francisco) proved to be a worthy adversary in this test of
wills.
For every damaging provision that anti-park legislators demanded, Representative Pelosi made sure that language providing protection for the Park was also in place, starting with
the findings themselves. In this section, Congress was forced
to acknowledge the tremendous significance of the Presidio's
resources calling it "one of America's great natural and historic
sites."s9 The Presidio's inclusion within the boundary of Golden
Gate National Recreation Area was preserved.90 Moreover, the
legislation requires that park resources be managed in such a
way as to "protect[ ] the Presidio from development and uses
which would destroy the scenic beauty and historic and natural
character of the area and cultural and recreational
resources. ,,91
Despite the removal of the Trust from the jurisdiction of the
Interior Department, Representative Pelosi assured it would
have a close relationship with the Park Service and the Secretary of the Interior. First, as indicated above, the law requires
that the Secretary of the Interior, or his or her designee, be a

87. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(0).
88.Id.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 101(1).
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 101(5).
91. Id.
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member of the Trust Board.92 This and other membership requirements of the Board are intended to help establish strong
resource protection representation among the individuals responsible for the Presidio's fate. Second, the law provides that,
for purposes of carrying out its mandate, the Trust is to be considered a successor in interest to the Park Service with respect
to compliance to the National Environmental Policy Act and all
other environmental laws as well as National Historic Preservation Acts. 93 In effect, the Trust must follow all of the same
statutes that govern the Park Service in its administration of
other parks and must include the public in its decision making.
In addition, the Trust must work closely with the Interior Department and the Park Service in a number of key areas.
The Trust is, for example, required to comply with GGNRA
park "purposes" and with "the general objectives of the General
Management Plan" for the Presidio.94 It must consult with the
Secretary of the Interior in preparing its management program
as well as in developing its rules and regulations.95 The Trust,
too, is responsible for cooperating with the Park Service to assure visitor access, interpretation and educational programs in
lands it administers.96 Finally, Representative Pelosi sought to
protect the lands that were not specifically related to real estate management, but were nonetheless administratively
transferred to the Trust - i.e. open space lands and the Presidio's historic forest.
Specifically, the law requires the Trust to maintain at least
the current amount of open space at the Presidio and prohibits
it from disposing of or conveying fee title to any real property
under its administration.97 Additionally, the Trust is encouraged to transfer administration back to the Secretary of the
Interior, of any lands which are not needed by it and which
have high public use potentia1.98 In its original form, the Trust

92. See 16 U.S.C. § 103(eX1XA).
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(e).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 104(a).
95. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(e), (j).
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 102(b).
97. See 16 U.S.C. § 104(b).
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 105(b).
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legislation provided only for transfer of buildings to the trust,
as these were the marketable resource. The 104th Congress,
however, sought - and obtained - a much larger transfer.99 It
seems likely that, as open space has little rental value and requires management, the Trust will move quickly to place these
lands back under the jurisdiction of the agency that clearly can
protect and manage them.
These provisions, however, cannot and do not transform the
Presidio Trust legislation into a traditional park bill. It is patently the product of the 104th Congress. Its features represented the very best the anti-park forces could achieve in the
face of the backlash their own over-reaching created. Although
they could not sell the Presidio or give it away or deny it the
funds needed for its management, they could and did give
management of its historic buildings to a wholly new government entity, responsible to them and not to the Interior Department. In addition, they could and did require the Trust to
achieve self-sufficiency within flfteen years, during which time
appropriations would decline. And, last but by no means least,
they could and did require that, if the goal of self-sufficiency is
not met, the Park's lands be put on the block.
While it yet remains to be seen whether that draconian result will occur, even if the Trust does not achieve this goal,
there is no question but that these provisions are unprecedented. No other park in the entire system is subject to even
one of these requirements, let alone all of them - and none, including the Presidio, should be.

99. AB the House Report noted, the legislation transferred "administrative jurisdiction over about 80 percent of the lands at the Presdidio from the Secretary to the
Trust". Although the area for which the Trust would be responsible "includes essentially all of the leasable building space," it is more than "just buildings." H.R. REP. No.
104-234, at 9 (1995).
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V. WHY THE PRESIDIO TRUST MODEL IS NOT
APPROPRIATE FOR OTHER PARKS

A.

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OUR NATIONAL PARKS

For Fiscal Year 1997, the Park Service's budget amounted
to $1.4 billion, with which it had to maintain 375 parks and
serve an estimated 276 million visitors. 1oo Overall, the vast
majority of the Service's budget comes from appropriated
funds. 101 Although a small amount of revenue is generated
through park entrance and permit fees, these funds only cover
the costs associated with collecting those fees with the remainder going to the Treasury.I02 Although $1.4 billion sounds like
a large amount and, in point of fact, is more than the other
land management agencies receive, in constant dollars, the
Park Service's budget declined by $635 million from 1978 to
1996. 103 At the same time, seventy-nine new parks have been
created and the number of annual visitors has increased by
almost 40 million. I04
Although $1.4 billion sounds like a lot, we spend a lot more
on other programs than we do on our parks. For example, we
spend $3.2 billion on the federal prison system and $22.3 billion on highway construction. We spend as much to subsidize
corporate cotton growers as we do on parks. lo5
For this $1.4 billion, Americans receive a park system that
is the envy of the rest of the world - and, in fact, many of the
visitors to our parks come from other countries. What is more,
there is no better recreation deal in this country than touring
the National Parks. Even with the recent increase of fees at
Yellowstone, Yosemite and Grand Teton National Parks to $20
per week, enjoyment of these unique areas is a bargain com-

100. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 17.
101. See id.
102. A new fee program has allowed 100 of our most popular National Parks to retain 80% of specified fee increases to address backlogged maintenance projects on a
three-year experimental basis. See Pub. L. No. 104-134 (1996).
103. See BUCCINO, supra note 2, at 17.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 21.
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pared to a visit to an amusement park for a day, a professional
sporting event, or a professional performing arts production.
Our parks produce real benefits for visitors and others.
They provide all who visit them with the opportunity to learn
about how our ancestors lived and how America used to be. We
cherish our parks because they keep our natural, cultural, and
ecological history alive. They also provide significant economic
benefits for those who work in them or whose businesses depend on them. 106 These myriad benefits are the reason why
past Congresses - including even the 104th Congress - have
seen fit to create new parks again and again since 1872, even
as opponents claim that we have too many or they cost too
much.
B. WHAT IF OTHER PARKS WERE REQUIRED TO BE
SELF-SUFFICIENT?

Many of those who oppose our national parks claim that
they should be self-sufficient - that each park should raise the
funds needed for its operation or else face being shut down.
They strongly advocate "relying on park visitors, not Congress,
for operating support" for all of our parks,I°7 regardless of the
sums involved, the resources preserved, and questions of equity
or access by the poor. IOB Many advocates of self-sufficiency are
likely to support the notion of exploiting park resources as a
means of supporting park operations. As such, they can be expected to point to the Trust legislation as a model for other
parks.

106. According to the National Park Service, the national parks generate roughly
$10 billion a year in their surrounding economies. The Interior Department has estimated that communities surrounding the parks lost $14 million in tourism sales every
day that the parks were closed during the winter of 1995-96. NPCA, THE ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 67, at Preface.
107. See, e.g., DONALD R. LEAL & HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, BACK TO THE FuTuRE
TO SAVE OUR PARKS (PERC Policy Series, Issue Number PS-10) (June 1997).
108. Polls indicate that people would be willing to pay more than they do now to
visit parks, but would oppose efforts to raise fees on an across-the-board basis as well
as at parks used heavily by those with limited means. See, e.g., AMERICAN VIEWS ON
NATIONAL PARK ISSUES, A SUMMARY REPORT BY THE NATIONAL PARKS & CONSERVATION ASSocIATION AND HUMAN DIMENSIONS IN NATIONAL RESOURCES UNIT,
COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY (May 21, 1996).
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As noted earlier, the Presidio's historic buildings are unique
in that their preservation requires their use. That use can
generate funds which directly benefit the resource. Moreover,
because the Presidio has so many buildings and is so well situated, it is at least conceivable that rental income will suffice to
cover management needs. The same cannot be said about the
resources in other units of the National Park System. In other
.parks, using resources to generate operating funds would directly harm those resources and the parks within which they
are located; it would also degrade the visitor experience. What
is more, it is by no means clear that making use of the resources of these parks would generate significant sums of
money, let alone the amounts that are needed.

First of all, many of the resources protected by our parks
are not renewable. Take for example the geologic formations in
Utah's Arches National Park. Once those formations are gone,
they are gone forever. They cannot be recreated. "Using" such
resources to generate operating funds would be inconsistent
with the preservation ideal that is the fundamental premise of
our national parks.
Some may argue that certain resources, while not renewable, are not even seen by visitors and should, therefore, be
utilized. Gold and other minerals come to mind - along with
images of the destruction that would result from an open pit
gold mine in the heart of Mojave National Preserve, images
that include piles of ore soaked in cyanide rising above the desert landscape along with the mountains of waste rock. Such a
mine would not only be seen, it would also be heard. It would
ruin the natural quiet of the Preserve and would forever alter
its natural landscape.
The huge public outcry that arose at home and abroad when
a massive gold mine was proposed just outside the border of
Yellowstone National Park is evidence of just how controversial
such a project would be. In addition, because such mines are
governed by the Mining Law of 1872, they would generate nei-
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ther rents nor royalties for the federal government - so would
contribute nothing to operating costs ofthe parks.109
Then there are the resources which have the capacity to regenerate on their own. The giant redwoods of California's
Redwood State and National Parks are a good example. A salvage logging operation following a major storm or wildfire
might seem to be a reasonable way to reap tremendous profits
for the park which could then be used for other park protection
projects. At least one state park - Custer State Park in South
Dakota - allows timber harvesting to obtain operating funds llo
and has been hailed as a model for federal parks to emulate.l11
Yet the construction of logging roads, the impacts to endangered species, and the degradation of watersheds and rivers
that would result make this, too, an untenable option for park
funding.
Similarly, grazing exists in a number of park units, a vestige of our "traditional use" of public lands. ll2 What would be
the response to proposals for the return of domestic sheep to
Yosemite's alpine meadows, or the elimination of bison within
Yellowstone's borders to make way for the introduction of privately-owned cows? Already restive over the environmental

109. Exploration for, and development of, gold, silver, copper and other so-called
"hard rock" minerals on federal lands is governed by the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C.
§ 22 et seq. (1994). Under this law, any business or citizen can locate a claim on up to
20 acres of non-withdrawn or "open" public lands. See, e.g., COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL
RESOURCES, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER: PuBLIC SUBSIDIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT at 14 (August 1994) (hereinafter "COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES,
TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER"). It has been estimated that, overall, the National Park
System contains over two thousand mining claims. See Todd Wilkinson, Undermining
the Parks, NATIONAL PARKS, Jan.IFeb. 1991, at 29. Minerals that are extracted from
these claims are extracted free of charge. See COMMI'ITEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES,
TAKING FROM THE TAXPAYER, supra, at 15.
110. See NPCA Statement on South Dakota Proposal, supra note 43.
111. See LEAL & FRETWELL, supra note 107, at 26-29. The authors, however, do not
acknowledge that logging takes place in this park - or perhaps they do not know.
112. Currently livestock grazing is occurring in units such as Great Basin, Channel
Islands, Gettysburg and Death Valley National Parks as well as in Point Reyes National Seashore and Mojave National Preserve. Grazing impacts on the Channel Islands have resulted in the listing of several endangered plant taxa, the imposition of a
Clean up or Abatement Order for violations of the Clean Water Act, and a lawsuit by
the National Parks and Conservation Association.
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impacts of grazing in other parks and other federal lands, the·
public ·would find expansion of this activity in our national
parks abhorrent. What is more, because federal grazing too is
traditionally subsidized through, for example, imposition of
below-cost, below-market grazing fees,113 this use would be extremely unlikely to generate much in the way of funds.
To follow this line of reasoning to its extreme, we return to
the Presidio. If buildings are the only reasonable means by
which we can extract money from our national parks, why
should we not build more of them? Historically, a swank development was planned for the Limantour Beach area of Point
Reyes National Seashore. The plans for that subdivision still
exist in a Park Service archive. Long-term leases of the houses
of such a development could generate enough revenue to provide for the administration of Point Reyes and number of
smaller parks.
But now we have come full circle. That proposed development was precisely the reason Congress chose to protect this
unparalleled natural area in the first place.
The fact is our national parks have been set aside because
they are worthy of preservation for present and future generations - and that is the mandate the Park Service has been
given for their management.114 To require them to earn their
operating funds would necessarily mean the Park Service
would have to stop managing for the long term and begin instead to look for short term resource management strategies
that would maximize return - an approach that is fundamentally inconsistent with long term resource preservation. Parks
benefit the nation - and the nation, through the U.S. Treasury,
should provide for their operational needs.
Indeed, rather than continue to insist that the Presidio become self-sustaining or else, the legislation that established the
Trust should be amended to ensure that this extraordinary site

113. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, ET AL., GREEN SCISSORS 1997 - CUTTING
WASTEFUL AND ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL SPENDING AND SUBSIDIES 25 (1997).
114. See 1916 Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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with its remarkable resources will be protected and preserved
for future generations to enjoy and appreciate.
VI. HOW THE PRESIDIO TRUST LEGISLATION SHOULD
BE CHANGED
By now it should be clear why the Presidio Trust legislation
should be changed. The law takes unprecedented steps to remove the Presidio from National Park Service jurisdiction,
limits, and eventually eliminates, appropriations to the park,
and directs sale of the property should the Trust fail to achieve
self-sufficiency by the specified date. Moreover, due to the political dynamics which created the legislation, we can assume
that efforts will be made to apply this approach to other units
of the National Park System. But, just as the l04th Congress
found it could not muster support for sweeping change, proponents of an improved Presidio Trust should not expect wholesale change overnight.
In the near term, the language regulating the Trust is a
danger to the preservation of the Presidio. In the long term, it
has the potential to undermine the entire park system. Given
congressional politics, prioritizing action to avert these threats
is not only the logical strategy, it is essential.
The single greatest immediate threat to the Presidio's resources is the requirement that Trust operate self-sufficiently
within fifteen years and the penalty if it does not. These two
inextricably-linked provisions hang like the sword of Damocles
over the Trust, and will necessarily influence its management
decisions. For example, faced with the threat of sale, the Trust
will be forced to seek out tenants who are able to pay t~e highest rents and have the flexibility to move quickly when leases
are let. Disadvantageq in this scenario, or one could say discriminated against, will be nonprofit organizations and small
businesses dedicated to finding solutions to environmental
problems and creating sustainable economies.
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Instead of the synergistic, future-oriented community envisioned in the park's General Management Plan,115 the Presidio's buildings may simply be rented to a variety of businesses
in order to achieve self-sufficiency and avoid sale. 116 Because a
host of management decisions will be affected by the selfsufficiency mandate, even if the reversion clause were omitted,
both features of the current law need to be eliminated.
As the legislation calls for decreasing appropriations over
the course of the fifteen years, one could argue that this provision should be the next to be amended .. Without the reversion
clause, however, the threat of selling off the Presidio would no
longer exist. The Trust would then have more latitude to follow the General Management Plan developed by the Park
Service. While the Trust could potentially receive fewer federal
dollars to work with, it is far less likely that it would fail outright. For this reason, as well as the potential for raising
money through grants and private donations, the Presidio
would be better served by an amendment that would bring the
Trust back under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, than by one which would address appropriations.

Amending the law to reincorporate the Presidio's real estate
into the Golden Gate National Recreation Area and place the
Trust under National Park Service Administration is the next
step to assuring appropriate use of the historic buildings and
the protection of the natural areas. The Trust would still have
the responsibility for real estate management, a task most
agree is beyond the Park Service's capability. The agency does,
however, have the expertise as well as the mandate to preserve
the Presidio's resources and to manage them consistent with
the General Management Plan as well as to comply with all
other applicable federal laws. Placing the Trust under the jurisdiction of the Park Service is the best way of ensuring that

115. See NPS, FINAL PRESIDIO GENERAL PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 10, at v (A
Vision for the Presidio).
116. This is not to say that the author believes there is any realistic possibility that
a high-rise mall will built on Presidio grounds, as some opponents of the legislation
fear. See, e.g., Angela Alioto, The Presidio Land Grab, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 20,
1997.
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the preservation mandate is met for all resources - both natural and historic - at the Presidio.
With these three modifications, restrictions which would either result in the loss of the Presidio outright or significantly
alter the park's mission would be removed. As opportunities
arise, whether by a change in political leadership or public demand, further amendments could be offered to increase appropriations, remove the language mandating a maximum return
on the real estate, and correct other flaws in the law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

If the Presidio's vast panoply of cultural and natural resources are what establishes the park as unique among units of
the National Park System, its management by the Presidio
Trust only sets it further apart. From the beginning, when the
Presidio made the transition from post to park, its proximity to
a large urban area, the cost of its maintenance, and the desirability of its real estate, all conspired to bring attention and
scrutiny from leaders of the l04th Congress in need of fodder
for their anti-park agenda.
In many respects, that Congress successfully manipulated
the Presidio's uniqueness against ~tself and, ultimately, the
entire system. Having failed in a wholesale attempt to liquidate our national parks, Congress made history by transferring
the Presidio's management out of the National Park Serviceand future Congresses may well attempt to build on this success.
If history is any guide, the Presidio Trust is likely to be seen
as a "bold" and "daring" model by many in the Congressional
debates to come. Therefore, amending the Presidio Trust legislation to bring it more in line with traditional Park Service
management is imperative. Correcting the anti-park provisions of the law will not only help retain the unique resources
of the Presidio, it will also help defend the integrity of our entire system of national parks now and in the future.
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